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Introduction
This paper is concerned with the labor market effects of the Swedish self-
employment start-up program. The main goal of self-employment schemes is to
increase the rate of outflow from unemployment and to stimulate the creation
of employment in small businesses. Such schemes involve either an allowance
to support the self-employed person through an introductory phase or a capital
subsidy to cover part of the initial investment costs. Measures that aim at
stimulating unemployed job seekers to start businesses on their own may
constitute essential instruments in the toolbox of a country’s labor market
policy. The most common argument for subsidizing start-ups among the unem-
ployed is the existence of barriers for some categories of unemployed persons.
It may, for example, concern capital constraints, shortages of specific business
human capital, or the absence of social networks (see e.g., Meager 1996;
Blanchflower and Oswald 1998). There are a number of studies focusing on
the effectiveness of self-employment schemes with regard to the labor market
outcomes for unemployed participants (e.g., Meager 1996; Baumgartner and
Caliendo 2008; Caliendo 2009; Caliendo and Künn 2011; Michaelides and
Benus 2012; Caliendo and Künn 2014 and 2015; Caliendo et al. 2015;
Caliendo et al. 2016).1
The present study evaluates the Swedish self-employment program’s effect on the
labor market outcomes for its participants. Our approach regarding examining the
average treatment effect on the treated adds some important contributions to previous
research. Firstly, very few studies exist that examine the long-term effects of starting
one’s own business to exit unemployment (see e.g., Caliendo et al. 2016). Former long-
term effects of start-ups are based on a maximum of a 40 month follow up period. In
this paper we use a 60 month observation period after start-up. It is important to
examine whether the positive effects that have been demonstrated by start-up actions
in Germany, for example, also apply within a different economic context. The activities
of the Nordic countries are particularly interesting; their specific institutional arrange-
ments create a strong link between work and compensation on the basis that the first
objective is getting a job and the second is receiving unemployment benefits (Kolm and
Tonin 2015).
Secondly, to identify the average treatment effect on the treated it is very important
that you have access to rich administrative information of labor market histories of
treated and untreated, see e.g. Fredriksson and Johansson (2008) and Caliendo et al.
(2016). We have detailed information on historical data regarding the employment and
earnings histories prior to the program as well as unemployment histories and personal
characteristics. The administrative data contains extensive information on individual
employment and unemployment histories covering 10 years before and five years after
treatment started. By making use of these data, we have been able to make follow-up at
two and five years after participating. Nearly all other studies provide short- to
1 One strand of evaluations of programs supporting business start-ups among the unemployed focuses on the
number of jobs created by newly developed businesses and/or on their survival rates (e.g., Pfeiffer and Reize
2000; Cueto and Mato 2006; Caliendo and Kritikos 2010). However, assessment of the program as an
instrument for enterprise promotion as a development strategy lies beyond our scope. For discussions of the
economic case for public policy in this area, see for example Storey (1994), Cressy (2002), and OECD (2003).
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medium-term evidence. The data also enable us to extend the core analysis to include
impacts relating to different levels of education.
The third contribution of this study involves the possibilities of taking the past
experiences of self-employment into account. As pointed out by Caliendo and Künn
(2011), previous experience of self-employment might play a key role for taking up
self-employment again as occupation. Other research points to the fact that the inter-
generational transmission of entrepreneurial skills is highly correlated with a person’s
probability of becoming self-employed, see e.g. Colombier and Masclet (2008) and
Lindquist et al. (2015). We have information about experience of self-employment and,
unlike all other start-up studies, information on whether either of the examined
individual’s parents has any business experience.
The fourth contribution to the literature is that, unlike other studies of start-ups, we
study explicitly how education affects the employment effects. In OECD countries, the
relative situation of low-skilled workers worsened during the last three decades (Oesch
2010). In the United States, this deterioration took the form of an increase in wage
inequalities (Autor et al. 2008). In European countries, such as France, Germany, and
Sweden, it led to higher unemployment rates among low-skilled workers. The activa-
tion of low-educated unemployed is an important contribution in analyzing whether
active labor market policies through support to start-ups are an effective way to
influence employment opportunities for different educational groups.
This paper proceeds as follows: we describe the Swedish self-employment scheme,
background theories and previous studies, the strategy for estimating treatment effects,
and the construction of the control groups of nonparticipants representing counterfac-
tuals of participation in the self-employment program. We present the estimated effects
of the program on such outcome variables as the transition from unemployment to
unsubsidized employment. The results also include an analysis of the impact by
educational background. Some discussion is presented and we conclude in
Section conclusion.
The Swedish Start-up Grants Program
The Start-up Grants program, which supports starting a business, was originally
introduced in Sweden on July 1, 1984. The Swedish self-employment scheme entitles
its participants to six months’ income support. The compensation may be extended in
some cases but only for sickness and when official authorization has been delayed. The
grant is usually equivalent to unemployment compensation. The activity support is
calculated, ratified, and paid out by the Swedish Social Insurance Agency. Earnings
from self-employment are not deducted from the subsidy.
For eligibility, one of six different categories has to be fulfilled: 1) being at least 25
years old and registered as a job seeker at an employment service as well as being in
need of enhanced support, 2) being young and having a disability that affects the ability
to work, 3) being 18 years of age and far from the labor market for specific reasons, 4)
meeting the conditions for participation in the Working Life Introduction Program, 5)
being at least 20 years old and meeting the conditions for participating in the Youth Job
Program, and 6) participating in the Job and Development Program. The job seeker
makes inquiries about the possibility of being granted a start-up subsidy. In other cases,
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the self-employment program is brought up for discussion in dialogues between the job
seeker and caseworker. If starting a business is determined to be a realistic alternative
for the job seeker, she or he must present a business plan to the employment office,
which in turn receives counsel from an external source regarding the commercial
viability of the business venture. Participants can be offered advice and information
in the initial stage of being self-employed and may, if they so desire, be given the
opportunity to take part in a training course for running a business.
Theory and Previous Studies
The theoretical framework for why a person chooses to become self-employed takes as
a starting point the opportunity cost of self-employment. A person is likely to become
self-employed if the potential gains from becoming self-employed exceed the cost. The
opportunity cost of becoming self-employed is either the wage from employment or the
benefits from unemployment insurance (see e.g., Rees and Shah 1986; de Wit and Van
Winden 1989; Johansson 2000; Hammarstedt 2006; Hammarstedt and Shukur 2009).
Based on this framework, the literature distinguishes between a number of sources that
influence the expected revenues and cost of becoming self-employed. On one hand,
there are Bpull^ factors, where the objective for becoming self-employed is to explore
business opportunities (see e.g., Dennis 1996; Blanchflower and Oswald 1998). In the
literature, this type is sometimes also labeled opportunity entrepreneurs. On the other
hand, and most likely the case for the unemployed, there are also Bpush^ factors. These
are factors that make self-employment the least unattractive among unattractive options
(see e.g., Storey 1985; Storey and Johnson 1987; Persson 2004; Dawson and Henley
2012; Mångs 2013). These self-employed become so out of necessity, (i.e., necessity
entrepreneurs). A characteristic that can be associated with both push and pull are the
degree of risk aversion. According to Ekelund et al. (2005), persons that are less risk
averse become self-employed to a greater extent. A factor that is likely to reduce the
risk associated with becoming self-employed is if the unemployed has his or her own,
or family experience, of self-employment. Dawson et al. (2009) state that, BOnce a
person has been pulled or pushed into self-employment they are likely to continue to
choose self-employment as an occupation^ (p. 6). It is, however, not only a person’s
own experiences that are likely to influence preferences. Having parents that are/were
self-employed increases the probability that a child becomes self-employed later in life
(see, e.g., Dunn and Holtz-Eakin 2000; Shane 2003).
For our study, factors that influence the likelihood that a person will choose to
become self-employed are important since these factors will introduce the possibility of
self-selection into the program. Since we use a matching approach for investigating the
impact of the program, we need to address both administrative- and self-selection as
possible problems for identification.
Previous Studies on Start-up Grants for the Unemployed
There have been some studies in the 2000s on the impacts of programs close to or
equivalent to the Swedish SEP-program. In an evaluation of business start-up
support for young people in the UK, Meager et al. (2003) estimate the effect on
392 J Labor Res (2016) 37:389–411
subsequent employment status for program participants whose businesses have
closed down. The analysis is based on a comparison with a group of young people
whose employment status was the same as that of their counterparts on the date
when the latter entered self-employment. No evidence is found that participation in
the program had any impact on the participants’ subsequent employment status.
Baumgartner and Caliendo (2008) compare the effectiveness of two German pro-
grams designed to stimulate unemployed persons to become entrepreneurs with
other active labor market policy programs. The results of their study, focusing on
West Germany, indicate that both start-up schemes are successful. At the end of the
observation period, the unemployment rate was lower for participants than for
nonparticipants, and both the probability of being in paid employment or self-
employment and personal income were higher. In a second evaluation of the two
German start-up schemes, Caliendo (2009) concentrates on East Germany and finds
that both programs were successful there. The risk of returning to unemployment
was lower for program participants than for nonparticipants while the probabilities
of being employed/self-employed and personal income were both higher. Almeida
and Galasso (2010) study the effects of a self-employment program in Argentina
and find that, in the short run, the program does not produce any income gains for
the average participant, even though the total number of hours worked increases.
Rodriguez-Planas and Benus (2010) investigate the impacts of four labor market
programs in Romania: training and retraining, employment and relocation services,
small business assistance offering services to facilitate business start-ups for
displaced entrepreneurs, and public employment. Their analysis reveals that the
first three mentioned programs had positive effects on the labor market outcomes of
the program participants. Caliendo and Künn (2011) estimate the long-term effects
of the two German start-up programs against the effects of non-participation.
Observing individuals for nearly five years following start-up, the researchers find
that both schemes improve both employment probabilities and earnings.
Michaelides and Benus (2012), who examine the efficacy of providing self-
employment training in an American program, conclude that it was effective in
helping unemployed persons to start a business and to transit to employment. Even
five years after the program, the authors find a significant impact on avoiding
unemployment. Caliendo and Künn (2014) examine the potentially heterogeneous
effects of start-up programs across regional labor markets. They discover that both
the development of businesses and program effectiveness are influenced by the
economic conditions prevailing at start-up. Start-up programs are also interesting
from a business/economic growth perspective. In a study comparing subsidized
start-ups and regular business start-ups, Caliendo et al. (2015) reach the conclusion
that firms that are started with a subsidy by the unemployed have, on one hand, a
higher survival rate, but on the other hand, they perform worse in terms of income,
business growth, and innovation. Using long-term informative data, Caliendo and
Künn (2015) state that start-up programs persistently integrate formerly unem-
ployed women into the labor market in contrast to female unemployed nonpartic-
ipants. It has been shown that personality traits affect labor market outcomes,
Heckman et al. (2006). Caliendo et al. (2016) investigate the role that individuals’
personalities play for the estimation of causal programme effects under the CIA.
They confirm high effectiveness of the former programmes. Their results indicates
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that the large set of control variables, including labor market history information, in
the estimation of the propensity score, even when not directly controlling for
personality, already sufficiently captures individuals´ personalities.
To sum up, the papers look at probabilities of leaving unemployment, probability of
re-entering unemployment, and impacts on future income. For the cases of Germany,
and the US, we find positive employment effects of start-ups, but we find no effects of
supporting start-ups in Argentina and Romania. The evidence varies with respect to
countries, the institutional design of the support, and entrance conditions. Most studies
are either focused on parts of the labor market (e.g., young people, women, unemployed
in different geographical areas of the country). Most of the studies provide evidence only
for the short run. Only two studies analyses the long-run effects. To further strengthen
the importance of long-term follow-up, we use a 60 months follow up period instead of
40 months. Caliendo et al. (2016) contributes to the literature with the study of
personality traits and the evaluation of start-up subsidies concluding that having access
to rich administrative labor history data leading to including and excluding individuals’
personalities do not significantly affect the results. To identify the effects of start-ups on
employment, the identification of the selection into self-employment becomes very
important. The Caliendo et al. (2016) paper shows that personality traits are correlated
with labor market and human capital controls. However, according to the entrepreneur-
ship literature the most important factor explaining why some people become entrepre-
neurs, but not others, is parental entrepreneurship. According to our review of the
literature this is a characteristic not controlled for in previous studies.
Empirical Strategy
Estimation Strategy
Our estimation strategy is based on the potential outcome approach, also known as the
Rubin (1974) model. We denote the potential outcome of participating in the program
as the potential outcome of not participating as and the actually observed outcome as
Further, let signify participation and nonparticipation. We are interested in assessing the
average treatment effect on the treated given by where denotes the mean in the
population of program participants. The problem with the identification of is that the
counterfactual outcome for participants is not observable. Assuming, however, that
program participation and program outcome are independent conditional on a set of
observed covariates,X, then E(Y0|D = 1, X) = E(Y0|D = 0, X). 2 To adjust for
confounding biases when estimating impacts of having participated in the SEP, we
make use of matching techniques. Our analysis compares the treated to three different
categories of comparison groups i.e., multiple treatment analysis (see e.g., Imbens
2000; Lechner 2001).3
2 The mentioned assumption is known as the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) (Rubin 1974)
Bselection on observables^ (Barnow et al. 1980) and as Bignorable treatment assignment^ (Rosenbaum and
Rubin 1983).
3 For an account of propensity score matching estimators and suggestions for their implementation, see
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), Joffe and Rosenbaum (1999), Rosenbaum (2002), Baser (2006), and Caliendo
and Kopeinig (2008).
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Data
We use a data set that combines administrative data from the Swedish Public Employ-
ment Service (PES) with register data from Statistics Sweden. The major part of the
data set contains information for the 2003–2007 periods; however, we also have
historical information about unemployment history, employment history, and self-
employment experience. Information was gathered from the PES information about
jobseekers who were unemployed in 2003 and who were transferred to the self-
employment program (SEP) for a six-month period starting in 2003. The number of
observations in that category (the SEP category) is 15,106.
Since the purpose of the study is to evaluate the self-employment scheme as an
active labor market program for unemployed job seekers, information from the PES
was also collected about those that were eligible for participation in the SEP but did not
join the program, see Biewen et al. (2014) for a discussion about the importance of data
and methodological choices. This is a non-SEP category from which one of our control
groups was selected (cf. Baumgartner and Caliendo 2008, p. 348; Caliendo 2009, p.
627). Henceforth, those in this category will be referred to as all eligible nonpartici-
pants. The number of observations in that category is 466,691. We also decided to take
into account comparisons with two less diverse control groups. In the interest of the
study, the reasonable basis from which to choose such groups consists of unemployed
job seekers with characteristics that match the criteria by which candidates for the self-
employment program are judged. Therefore, the two other control groups used in the
study were selected from subcategories taken from All eligible nonparticipants, viz.: (1)
Job seekers who were registered as openly unemployed (i.e., those who were not
participating in any active labor market policy program) from the category referred to
in the study as Receiving only job search assistance, whose number of observations is
331,906; and (2) Job seekers who had been transferred to labor market programs other
than the self-employment program, excluding programs for job seekers with occupa-
tional disabilities, form a category consisting of 127,742 persons, which in the study are
referred to as Participants in other active labor market programs (ALMPs).
Identification
Our identification strategy is based on an extensive set of variables that are likely to
influence program participation and labor market outcome.4 In the matching process,
the individual covariates of SEP-participants and nonparticipants are entered into a
probit model to estimate their propensity score (i.e., the probability of being selected for
the SEP based on observable predictors). In the following section we present and
discuss the variables that entered our prediction of being selected for participating in the
SEP-program in relation to theory and previous research.
To identify the effects of start-ups, controlling the selection into self-employment
becomes very important. Unlike other studies of SES, we have access to the most
important control explaining why some become self-employed and others not. To quote
Lindquist et al. (2015, p.269-270): BWhy do some people become entrepreneurs but not
others? The entrepreneurship literature asserts a number of factors that influence this
4 Descriptive statistics of the data are presented in Appendix A.
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choice. The most prominent among these factors is parental entrepreneurship. Having
an entrepreneur for a parent increases the probability that a child ends up as an
entrepreneur by 30–200% (Dunn and Holtz-Eakin 2000; Arum and Mueller 2004;
Sörensen 2007; Colombier and Masclet 2008; Andersson and Hammarstedt 2010,
2011).^ Surprisingly, this type of information has not been used in previous evaluations
of start-up grants despite its importance. As for the variables capturing parents’ self-
employment experience, we have two sets of variables: mother/father self-employed
2002 and mother/father self-employed some time during 1990–2001.
In the data, we have information about a number of variables that reveal the
unemployment history of SEP participants and nonparticipants which will be referred
to as Bpretreatment variables.^ Some of these variables are related to the jobseeker’s
registration period at the PES that serves as the basis of the study and some to a period
of four years before that base period. Regarding the time in the base period before
transition to the SEP for participants in that program or, when relevant, to another
ALMP for nonparticipants, we have information about (a) number of days registered as
openly unemployed obtaining baseline services from the PES and (b) total number of
days registered at the PES including both open unemployment, thus obtaining baseline
services and ALMP-participation. Furthermore, for a period of four years before the
base period, we have information about a second set of variables: (c) Number of days
registered at the PES, (d) Number of days registered at the PES as openly unemployed,
(e) Number of spells of open unemployment, and (f) Number of ALMPs in which the
individual has participated. With regard to the four time variables, (a)–(d), we have
defined three dummy variables indicating 1–180 days, 181–365 days, and more than
365 days. The pretreatment characteristics should capture important personality traits
such as individuals’ perceptions of their employment prospects, their motivation and
their ability, stigma effects, and depreciation of human capital (see e.g., Fredriksson and
Johansson 2008). The importance of having access to labor market history variables is
also pointed out by other researchers. For example Caliendo et al. (2016) address
explicitly if variables such as personality traits cause concern about the validity of the
unconfoundedness assumption. Their results show no significant difference using
personality traits and they conclude by these two sentences on p. 24: BOne possible
explanation is that personality is already implicitly reflected to a large extent by other
covariates which have been affected by personality themselves. We find evidence
supporting this notion, which particular emphasis on the important role of human
capital attainment and labor market history.^
We also have information about such characteristics as age, gender, marital status,
and ethnic origin, which together with occupation sought, have proven from previous
research to be vital determinants of both labor market possibilities and the probability
of becoming self-employed. Human capital information was gathered on general and
occupation-specific education and on the subjective judgment of experience for the
occupation sought. As noted by Sianesi (2004), the latter can be viewed as a summary
statistic of the previous accumulation of on-the-job training and learning by doing.
According to Ham and LaLonde (1996, p. 184), differences in this respect result from
both observed and unobserved differences between the treatment group members’ and
control group members’ characteristics.
Information was also obtained about indicators relevant to employment prospects
such as occupational disability and whether only a full-time or only a part-time job was
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sought or if either of these alternatives could be accepted. We assume that persons that
restrict the number of hour they are prepared to work are less likely to become self-
employed.
We also have categorical information from the PES about unemployment insurance
fund membership. For those with previous work experience this information will
capture the sector of previous occupation. We include this information since we expect
that work experience from the private sector might influence the probability of choos-
ing to become self-employed.
As pointed out in the theoretical section, becoming self-employed is a choice made
depending on the difference between opportunities and costs. This difference will be
different depending on the labor market status before entering the program. We have
information about the situation in 2002 regarding if the unemployed had an income
from work before they entered unemployment, if a person were out of the labor force,
or if the unemployed were in the labor force but getting income from social assistance.
For those who were employed, we also include the income obtained in 2002 (i.e., the
year prior to treatment). If a person had a job and income in close proximity before
becoming unemployed, we assume that the cost associated with unemployment will be
higher and therefore influence the motivation for leaving unemployment rapidly.
Another factor mentioned in the literature is access to capital to start a business (see
e.g., Lindh and Ohlsson 1996). We do not have explicit information about access to
capital but use income from capital in 2002 as an indicator. A negative income from
capital will make it less likely that the person could obtain financing from banks, for
example, while positive capital indicates that there are the individual’s own assets that
can be used to finance a start-up.
As mentioned in Dawson et al. (2009), for example, an individual’s own experience
is likely to reduce the expected risk associated with becoming self-employed. A
contribution of this study, compared to previous research on start-up grants, is that
we have information about an individual’s previous experience of self-employment. We
use two variables to capture an individual’s own experience as an entrepreneur. The
first variable indicates if the unemployed had been self-employed the year before
treatment, and the second variable indicates if the unemployed had any self-
employment experience in the 10 year period prior to becoming registered
unemployed.
Finally, as pointed out in Svaleryd (2015), for example, local labor market condi-
tions can play a role in self-employment. We include county fixed effects to control for
differences in local labor market conditions.5
Using non-experimental data could lead to selection bias. This bias is due to the fact
that participants and nonparticipants are selected in groups that would have different
outcomes due to observable and unobservable factors. In this study, propensity score
matching is used, and thus, we rely on the conditional independence assumption (CIA).
Based on this extensive set of variables presented in this section, we argue that our
application make it possible to study the effects of the Swedish start-up program.
However, we provide a sensitivity analysis where we assess the robustness of our
results with respect to unobserved differences between participants and non-
participants.
5 County fixed effects are included in the regression but are omitted from the presentation.
J Labor Res (2016) 37:389–411 397
Matching Method and Estimator
We estimate the effect for each participant i by contrasting his or her outcome with the
weighted average outcomes for nonparticipants j in the way given by Eq. (1), where i
and j indicate each observation in the participant and nonparticipant group respectively,
N1 and N0 are numbers of observations among participants and nonparticipants, and is
the matching weights mentioned above that are placed on the jth nonparticipant
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There are several estimators to choose from (see e.g., Frölich 2003; Huber et al.
2010; Huber et al. 2013). We use propensity score matching; however, as a sensitivity
check, other matching estimators (propensity score as well as inverse probability) and
other matching techniques (CEM-matching, see Iacus et al. 2011) have been used. The
results fall within the range of +/− 2 percentage points depending on the matching
estimator and method.6
Test for Hidden Bias
As in all observational studies, the reported impact and its inference are based on the
assumption that there are no unobserved cofounders and that all relevant explanatory
variables have been included in the selection model. There is no obvious way to test this
assumption; however, Rosenbaum (2002) provides a test to assess the robustness of the
matching estimator–the Rosenbaum bounds sensitivity test. 7 The idea behind the
Rosenbaum bounds test is that the probability for an individual i (πi) to be selected is not
only determined by the observed covariates (X) but also by some unobserved factor ui. Thus:
πi ¼ Pr T ¼ 1 Xijð Þ ¼ F βXi þ γuið Þ ð2Þ
In the absence of hidden bias, the parameter γ = 0. However, if γ is significantly
different from zero, hidden bias exists.
The Rosenbaum bound test is constructed so that it is targeting the opposite
question, i.e. how much would an unobserved covariate have to influence the proba-
bility to be selected in order to make an significant impact estimate insignificant. The
sensitivity analysis asks how much hidden bias can be present before the qualitative
conclusions of the study begin to change. The test uses the sensitivity parameter Γ to
indicate hidden bias. For each gamma greater than one an interval of p-values are
obtained. This interval reflects the uncertainty due to hidden bias (cf. Rosenbaum 2005,
6 After matching, a balancing test is performed to see whether propensity score matching successfully
balanced the covariates. The results of the balancing tests are shown in Tables 4, 5 and 6 in Appendix B.
The results indicate that the matched samples of SEP-participants and members of comparison groups
resemble each other in most respects.
7 See, for example, Aakvik (2001), Rosenbaum (2002), DiPrete and Gangl (2004), Becker and Caliendo
(2007), Ichino et al. (2008), and Drichoutis et al. (2009).
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p. 1810). To determine the level of uncertainty we identify the smallest gamma value
for which zero is contained in the p-value interval on a chosen level of significance. For
example; assume that the p-value intervals do not contain zero until Γ = 2. This result is
interpreted as that the confidence interval for the treatment effect would include zero if
an unobserved characteristics doubled the probability to be assigned to treatment, but
also that this characteristic almost perfectly predicted the difference in outcome be-
tween treated and untreated (see e.g. DiPrete and Gangl 2004).8
Effects of the Self-Employment Program
In this section, we present our results. The analysis is performed for the whole
population as well as for various levels of educational background.
The job seekers participating in the SEP are compared with samples of job seekers
taken from three other categories of job seekers registered at the PES:
– All eligible nonparticipants. This group consist of all unemployed that are regis-
tered at the public employment office.
– Receiving only job search assistance. This group includes those who, while being
registered at the PES, remained listed as openly unemployed.
– Participants in other ALMPs. This group includes those who were transferred to
programs other than the SEP.
As outcome variables, we use the probability of leaving unemployment for paid
employment, self-employment, or taking up education outside the ALMP programs.
In Table 1 we compare the matched sample of SEP participants with matched
samples of the three non-SEP categories with respect to the probability of leaving
unemployment for paid or self-employment. We use two points of time, December 31,
2005, and December 31, 2007, as the end dates of the follow-up periods. These dates
correspond to a two-year and a five-year follow-up period. In Table 1, the different
follow-up points are labeled before 2006 and before 2008.
The figures in Table 1 show that, at both follow-up points, there was a considerably
higher probability for SEP participants than for non-SEP participants of having
transited to unsubsidized employment. The differences are statistically significant.
Table 1 reports the results regarding the average treatment effect on the treated.
There is some variation in the results depending on which control group is used and the
length of the follow-up period. The largest impact reported occurs when the SEP group
is compared to participants in other ALMPs. The impact estimate, as compared to those
participating in other ALMPs, is that the probability of having left unemployment for
employment is increased by 43.5 percent-age points. The lowest impact estimate occurs
when we compare with the same group but add a five-year follow-up period. In this
case, the positive impact estimate shows an increase in the probability of leaving
unemployment by 34.9 percentage points. Overall, the results point to the fact that
the SEP is a successful program regarding the possibilities of getting a job or entering
regular education after participating in the SEP program.
8 For a detailed discussion on the Rosenbaum Bounds test, see Rosenbaum (2005).
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In the last column, the gamma value for the Rosenbaum bounds test for the binary
outcomes is reported.9 The value ranges from 5.4 to 7.4 indicating that if there were
hidden bias the odds of treatment has to change between 5.4 to 7.4 times due to
unobserved covariates in order to make the observed impact estimates insignificant.
That is, the Rosenbaum bounds test suggests that hidden bias has to be very large to
cause the true effect to be close to zero.
In summary, we find positive effects of the Swedish self-employment scheme regard-
ing the probability of having transited to unsubsidized employment at follow-up. The
results indicate that the self-employment scheme is effective in helping participants leave
unemployment and receive an unsubsidized employment position. Qualitatively as well as
quantitatively, our results are in line with what is reported in the literature. For example,
former studies demonstrate the strong effects of such programs in Germany on the
probability of not being registered at an employment office at a selected post-treatment
point in time. For Germany, depending on the gender of participants and the different
subprograms, for example, Baumgartner and Caliendo (2008) present a 17–28% lower
probability of being unemployed for the treated, Caliendo (2009) predicts 25–40% lower
probability to be unemployed for the treated 28 months after the program, and Caliendo
andKünn (2011) indicate 15–20%higher employment probability for those getting a start-
up subsidy compared to other unemployed.
Impact by Educational Background
In the following section, we investigate the effect of variation in the highest education
obtained by participants. We have classified education level into three groups:

























Before 2006 0.852 0.466 0.386 0.006 68.58 6.2
Before 2008 0.869 0.499 0.370 0.006 66.55 6.2
Receiving only job search assistance
Before 2006 0.852 0.495 0.357 0.006 57.51 5.4
Before 2008 0.869 0.495 0.374 0.006 60.85 6.4
Participants in other ALMPs
Before 2006 0.852 0.417 0.435 0.007 58.81 7.4
Before 2008 0.869 0.520 0.349 0.007 48.37 5.7
Standard errors according to Abadie and Imbens (2009). Γ reports the Mantel-Haenszel test statistics for the
Rosenbaum bounds test.
9 We use the user written command provided by and presented in Becker and Caliendo (2007).
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compulsory school, upper secondary school, and further education. All groups indicate
the highest educational status. In Table 2, we compare the matched sample of SEP
participants with matched samples of the three non-SEP categories for different
educational levels with respect to the probability of leaving unemployment for paid
self-employment or taking up education outside of ALMP measures for the two- and
five-year follow-up points.
The figures in the table show that, at both follow-up points, there was a
considerably higher probability for SEP participants than for non-SEP partici-
pants, regardless of educational attainment, of having transited to the outcomes
used. The differences are statistically significant. Depending on the year and
Table 2 Effects on the probability of having transited to unsubsidized employment before the beginning of



































ATET Before 2006 0.440 0.397 0.439 0.358
S.E (0.014) (0.009) (0.017) (0.010)
Γ 7.2 6.4 6.7 5.3
ATET Before 2008 0.417 0.381 0.423 0.338
S.E (0.014) (0.009) (0.017) (0.010)
Γ 6.8 6.5 6.7 5.4
Receiving only job search assistance
ATET Before 2006 0.435 0.374 0.384 0.331
S.E. (0.015) (0.010) (0.018) (0.011)
Γ 7.2 6.0 5.6 4.5
ATET Before 2008 0.445 0.390 0.400 0.350
S.E (0.015) (0.010) (0.018) (0.011)
Γ 7.7 6.9 6.3 5.3
Participants in other ALMPs
ATET Before 2006 0.511 0.427 0.469 0.400
S.E. (0.016) (0.012) (0.024) (0.014)
Γ 8.7 7.0 7.2 5.4
ATET Before 2008 0.426 0.340 0.375 0.294
S.E. (0.016) (0.012) (0.025) (0.014)
Γ 6.8 5.3 5.2 3.9
Standard errors in parenthesis according to Abadie and Imbens (2009). reports the Mantel-Haenszel test
statistics for the Rosenbaum bounds test.
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control group we analyze, the results indicate a probability of between 29 and
51 percentage points higher for the SEP participants to be in regular employ-
ment or education. The greatest effect we can observe is among the unem-
ployed with compulsory schooling as the highest level of education. This
indicates that the SEP also presents results that go in the direction of helping
mostly the low skilled. The Rosenbaum bond test points to the low probability
of the existence of hidden bias due to unobserved characteristics in the data.
The lowest gamma value 5.2 (further education and follow-up in 2008) indi-
cates that the odds of treatment due to unobserved variables have to change
with 5.2 in order to make the significant treatment effect insignificant.
Discussion
To find evidence on the effectiveness of policies targeted at start-ups, evaluators in
practice must rely on observational studies and make use of non-experimental methods.
This study essentially performs a multiple treatment analysis, as it compares the treated
to three different comparison groups. Our study shows that, relative to job seekers in
each of the three controls, participants in the SEP have a higher probability of transiting
to unsubsidized employment.
Our empirical strategy in this study is to use propensity score matching to
identify the impact of the SEP on employment. Although our empirical strategy
does not rely on a pure experiment with randomization, combining information
from previous research and a rich dataset containing information about the
factors that might be of importance for both self- selection and administrative
selection into the program, we would claim that our impact estimates are as
close as one can get using non-experimental methods. Personality traits proba-
bly play a decisive role in business start-up programs. According to studies
such as Sianesi (2004) and Fredriksson and Johansson (2008), the information
we use is highly correlated with important unobserved personality traits and
their effects (e.g., the selection into self-employment). A study by Caliendo
et al. (2016) present results of the importance of personality traits on the
outcome of evaluation of start-up subsidies, p.3: BWe further find that the
inclusion of personality variables in addition to the standard set of control
variables leads to only small and mostly insignificant changes in the treatment
effects.^ In the sensitivity tests performed using the equivalent to the
Rosenbaum bounds for dichotomous outcomes; we could see that unobserved
cofounders had to influence the selection into the program quite a bit in order
to make our results less creditable. A reason for this result might be that we
included almost all dimensions pointed out in previous research as factors that
influence preferences and motivation to become self-employed. We would
especially point to the fact that we included information about the persons
own, as well as the mothers’ and fathers’, experience of self-employment prior
to treatment. This information has not been included in previous observational
studies of self-employment programs and is, according to the entrepreneurship
literature, the single strongest explanation for choosing to become self-
employed, not only in the situation of unemployment but also for opportunity
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entrepreneurs. In Sweden, parental entrepreneurship increases the probability of
children´s entrepreneurship by about 60% (Lindquist et al. 2015).
We have, however, no information about the survival of firms that were started by
the unemployed who entered the self-employment program. Knowledge in that respect
would make it possible to also assess the program from the point of view of its
capability of stimulating the establishment of sustainable businesses.
Conclusion
This paper evaluates a self-employment start-up program based on matching
and a selection of observables assumption using data from administrative
records in Sweden. The main contribution of the paper is that it consider a
longer follow-up window than almost all others literature on start-up subsidies
and that it is based on a rich data set including, unlike other studies, informa-
tion of the most important factor explaining choosing to become self-employed–
namely, parental self-employment history.
Our results for the observation period show that the Swedish self-employment
scheme is effective from the perspective of employment. The probability of transiting
to unsubsidized employment or education is significantly higher for SEP participants
than for job seekers in the matched samples of non-SEP participants. When we study
different educational backgrounds, we find the strongest effects for the unemployed
with only compulsory school as the highest education level, suggesting that the
program also has good effects for the unemployed with difficulties in the labor market.
The research evidence on the effectiveness of self-employment assistance
programs for the unemployed conducted in the late 1980s and early 1990s in
Denmark, France, Hungary, Poland, the UK, the US, and West Germany do not
allow for authoritative judgment of the overall effectiveness of the schemes
studied. However, there is a clear picture from the 2000s. Research during this
time period reveals the positive effects of start-up programs in, for example,
Germany, New Zealand, and the United States, and now Sweden can be added
to that list. Whether this apparent change is due to the fact that the programs
become better or to changes in the labor market is difficult to determine and is a
matter for future research. It may also be that the developed scientific methods are
better able to capture the program impact. Our findings conform qualitatively with
evidence from other studies. The studies on the German start-up programs are
most similar to ours (e.g., Baumgartner and Caliendo 2008; Caliendo 2009;
Caliendo and Künn 2011), and a quantitative comparison with those studies results
in relatively good agreement between our results and these studies, but we present
even stronger effects. This could well be a factor that relates to institutional
differences between countries, but it could also be due to the fact that we in the
matching stage have a rich set of variables, including parents’ experience of being
self-employed, which has a very high predictive power.
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Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 Descriptive statistics: A = Treated, B =All eligible nonparticipants, C = Job seekers receiving only
job search assistance, D = Participants in other ALMPs. Information collected from Statistics Sweden and
from the job seeker register at the PES including individuals’ four-year labor market history.
Variable A A B B C C D D
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Dev. Dev. Dev. Dev.
Age (Mean) 38.77 9.92 35.74 12.21 34.54 11.89 38.84 12.52
Woman 0.37 0.48 0.42 0.49 0.43 0.49 0.42 0.49
Married 0.42 0.49 0.29 0.46 0.28 0.45 0.33 0.47
Native country
Nordic country 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.18
EU15 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.10
The rest of Europe 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.20
North America and Oceania 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.06
Africa 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14
Asia 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.29
Latin America 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.11
Education
Upper secondary school 0.44 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.48 0.50
Less than three years further education 0.11 0.31 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.25
University degree, more than two years 0.30 0.46 0.23 0.42 0.25 0.43 0.17 0.38
Disabled 0.08 0.27 0.12 0.33 0.07 0.25 0.27 0.44
Seeks only full-time employment 0.52 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.38 0.49
Seeks only part-time employment 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.21 0.08 0.26
Manual workers in the private sector 0.32 0.47 0.44 0.50 0.42 0.49 0.51 0.50
Salaried employees in the private sector 0.29 0.46 0.16 0.37 0.15 0.36 0.18 0.38
Self-employed 0.10 0.29 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14
Public employees 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.26 0.07 0.25
University graduates 0.09 0.29 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.25 0.05 0.21
Self-employed 2002 0.11 0.32 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.14
Employed 2002 0.45 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.41 0.49
Not in the labor force 2002 0.17 0.37 0.30 0.46 0.32 0.47 0.27 0.45
Self-employed 1990–2001 0.11 0.31 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24
Mother self-employed 2002 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.10
Father self-employed 2002 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.18 0.02 0.15
Mother self-employed 1990–2001 0.06 0.25 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.19
Father self-employed 1990–2001 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30 0.07 0.26
Income 2002 (SEK in 100s. Mean) 2152 1275 1663 1154 1665 1216 1667 995
Income from capital 2002 (SEK in 100s. Mean) −97 656 −24 2364 −22 2789 −28 458
Had social assistance 2002 0.06 0.24 0.16 0.37 0.15 0.36 0.18 0.38
Stated one sought occupation 0.58 0.49 0.72 0.45 0.71 0.46 0.77 0.42
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Appendix B. Balancing Tests
Table 3 (continued)
Variable A A B B C C D D
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Dev. Dev. Dev. Dev.
Stated more than one sought occupation 0.28 0.45 0.45 0.50 0.43 0.49 0.50 0.50
Educated in sought occupation 0.80 0.40 0.73 0.45 0.73 0.44 0.71 0.46
Experience in sought occupation 0.21 0.41 0.36 0.48 0.35 0.48 0.37 0.48
Registered at the employment office
1–180 days (four-year history)
0.01 0.09 0.15 0.36 0.17 0.37 0.11 0.31
Registered at the employment office
180–365 days (four-year history)
0.01 0.08 0.14 0.34 0.15 0.35 0.11 0.31
Registered at the employment office
above 356 days (four-year history)
0.04 0.20 0.45 0.50 0.42 0.49 0.52 0.50
Unemployment 1–180 days (four-year history) 0.02 0.13 0.27 0.45 0.30 0.46 0.22 0.41
Unemployment 180–365 days (four-year history) 0.01 0.11 0.17 0.37 0.17 0.38 0.15 0.36
Unemployment more than 365 days
(four-year history)
0.02 0.16 0.23 0.42 0.20 0.40 0.30 0.46
Number of unemployment spells (four-year
history)
0.14 0.69 1.89 1.81 1.95 1.88 1.73 1.61
Number of ALMP programs (four-year history) 0.11 0.71 0.98 1.95 0.78 1.67 1.50 2.43
N 15,106 466,691 331,906 127,742




Raw Matched Raw Matched
Age 0.273 −0.058 0.660 1.025
Woman −0.103 0.036 0.959 1.020
Married 0.269 −0.010 1.174 0.997
Nordic country −0.024 0.004 0.874 1.023
EU15 0.014 −0.006 1.134 0.949
The rest of Europe −0.048 0.004 0.763 1.023
North America and Oceania −0.004 0.005 0.941 1.082
Africa −0.099 0.002 0.418 1.025
Asia 0.006 −0.012 1.018 0.967
Latin America −0.084 −0.007 0.423 0.920
Upper secondary school −0.035 0.015 0.992 1.004
Less than three years further education 0.120 −0.019 1.410 0.955
University degree, more than two years 0.156 −0.009 1.183 0.992





Raw Matched Raw Matched
Disabled −0.133 −0.020 0.701 0.943
Seeks only full-time employment 0.226 0.003 1.036 1.000
Seeks only part-time employment −0.037 0.004 0.858 1.017
Manual workers in the private sector −0.250 0.045 0.886 1.037
Salaried employees in the private sector 0.320 −0.023 1.537 0.980
Self-employed 0.326 −0.053 4.290 0.871
Public employees −0.043 0.024 0.864 1.094
University graduates 0.111 −0.012 1.427 0.967
Self-employed 2002 0.368 −0.035 4.555 0.922
Employed 2002 −0.074 0.015 0.990 1.003
Not in the labor force 2002 −0.328 0.022 0.658 1.040
Self-employed 1990–2001 0.169 −0.067 1.658 0.856
Mother self-employed 2002 0.044 0.001 1.388 1.006
Father self-employed 2002 0.010 0.009 1.057 1.048
Mother self-employed 1990–2001 0.078 −0.011 1.360 0.961
Father self-employed 1990–2001 0.056 0.015 1.159 1.038
Income 2002 (SEK in 100s) 0.401 −0.032 1.222 0.563
Income from capital 2002 (SEK in 100s) −0.042 0.002 0.077 0.861
Had social assistance 2002 −0.309 −0.009 0.442 0.967
Stated one sought occupation −0.302 −0.019 1.217 1.007
Stated more than one sought occupation −0.343 −0.045 0.821 0.960
Educated in sought occupation 0.163 −0.007 0.818 1.010
Experience in sought occupation −0.324 0.011 0.732 1.015
Registered at the employment office 1–180 days (four-year history) −0.544 −0.019 0.067 0.824
Registered at the employment office 180–365 days (four-year history) −0.516 −0.018 0.060 0.818
Registered at the employment office above 356 days (four-year history) −1.070 −0.045 0.162 0.823
Unemployment 1–180 days (four-year history) −0.786 −0.031 0.080 0.801
Unemployment 180–365 days (four-year history) −0.561 −0.012 0.086 0.903
Unemployment more than 365 days (four-year history) −0.652 −0.043 0.135 0.782
Number of unemployment spells (four-year history) −1.273 −0.052 0.146 0.801
Number of ALMP programs (four-year history) −0.599 −0.037 0.134 0.691
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Raw Matched Raw Matched
Age 0.387 −0.034 0.696 1.019
Woman −0.109 0.031 0.957 1.017
Married 0.297 −0.009 1.205 0.997
Nordic country −0.016 0.018 0.914 1.115
EU15 0.012 −0.007 1.110 0.940
The rest of Europe −0.026 0.005 0.861 1.034
North America and Oceania −0.006 −0.008 0.914 0.892
Africa −0.103 −0.004 0.407 0.954
Asia 0.021 −0.017 1.067 0.952
Latin America −0.089 0.011 0.403 1.149
Upper secondary school −0.015 0.003 0.996 1.001
Less than three years further education 0.107 −0.019 1.352 0.954
University degree, more than two years 0.104 −0.001 1.110 0.999
Disabled 0.057 −0.005 1.205 0.984
Seeks only full-time employment 0.211 0.015 1.030 0.999
Seeks only part-time employment 0.001 −0.002 1.004 0.992
Manual workers in the private sector −0.198 0.025 0.899 1.020
Salaried employees in the private sector 0.342 −0.025 1.601 0.979
Self-employed 0.326 −0.045 4.312 0.888
Public employees −0.052 0.028 0.837 1.111
University graduates 0.086 −0.004 1.304 0.989
Self-employed 2002 0.359 −0.055 4.265 0.880
Employed 2002 −0.134 0.005 0.990 1.001
Not in the labor force 2002 −0.359 0.014 0.642 1.025
Self-employed 1990–2001 0.169 −0.075 1.661 0.841
Mother self-employed 2002 0.029 −0.001 1.230 0.991
Father self-employed 2002 −0.010 0.018 0.952 1.104
Mother self-employed 1990–2001 0.059 0.000 1.254 1.000
Father self-employed 1990–2001 0.031 0.005 1.083 1.013
Income 2002 (SEK in 100s) 0.391 −0.020 1.100 0.751
Income from capital 2002 (SEK in 100s) −0.037 0.008 0.055 0.756
Had social assistance 2002 −0.287 −0.001 0.461 0.997
Stated one sought occupation −0.262 −0.016 1.173 1.005
Stated more than one sought occupation −0.303 −0.029 0.830 0.974
Educated in sought occupation 0.146 −0.012 0.833 1.018
Experience in sought occupation −0.313 0.004 0.737 1.005
Registered at the employment office 1–180 days (four-year history) −0.585 −0.038 0.061 0.694
Registered at the employment office 180–365 days (four-year history) −0.543 −0.032 0.056 0.711





Raw Matched Raw Matched
Registered at the employment office above 356 days (four-year history) −0.996 −0.034 0.165 0.860
Unemployment 1–180 days (four-year history) −0.835 −0.048 0.076 0.712
Unemployment 180–365 days (four-year history) −0.572 −0.034 0.085 0.753
Unemployment more than 365 days (four-year history) −0.585 −0.014 0.149 0.919
Number of unemployment spells (four-year history) −1.274 −0.047 0.135 0.830
Number of ALMP programs (four-year history) −0.521 −0.015 0.181 0.898





Variable Raw Matched Raw Matched
Age −0.005 −0.090 0.628 1.041
Woman −0.094 0.016 0.961 1.009
Married 0.200 −0.026 1.110 0.993
Nordic country −0.046 0.010 0.776 1.065
EU15 0.021 −0.018 1.208 0.860
The rest of Europe −0.096 −0.019 0.605 0.894
North America and Oceania 0.002 0.004 1.032 1.064
Africa −0.090 −0.007 0.446 0.926
Asia −0.028 −0.033 0.922 0.910
Latin America −0.070 0.000 0.478 1.000
Upper secondary school −0.081 0.042 0.986 1.013
Less than three years further education 0.155 −0.027 1.585 0.937
University degree, more than two years 0.296 −0.041 1.456 0.966
Disabled −0.504 −0.005 0.383 0.985
Seeks only full-time employment 0.270 0.018 1.055 0.999
Seeks only part-time employment −0.128 0.014 0.618 1.064
Manual workers in the private sector −0.378 0.090 0.874 1.080
Salaried employees in the private sector 0.270 −0.031 1.409 0.973
Self-employed 0.324 −0.056 4.235 0.865
Public employees −0.021 −0.002 0.928 0.993
University graduates 0.178 −0.013 1.858 0.964
Self-employed 2002 0.387 −0.059 5.352 0.873
Employed 2002 0.080 0.022 1.023 1.005
Not in the labor force 2002 −0.257 −0.002 0.703 0.996
Self-employed 1990–2001 0.169 −0.100 1.656 0.799
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